Mahn Robert Zan

Mahn Ba Zan and Peace Negotiation Meetings

We who were fighting as National Democracy revolutionaries, on three occasions, have set down and conducted table warfare with the traitorous ruling class. The first time was with the U Nu-led AFPFL on April 6, 1949; the second in February of 1960 with the caretaker government led by Bo Ne Win; and the third on July 5, 1963 with the BSPP (Burma Socialist Program Party) dictatorship government of Bo Ne Win.

These were not groundless meetings. There has never been a country that benefited from prolonged warfare. Only those well acquainted with the consequences of warfare’s evil will fully understand the method of conducting continual warfare with benefits. It would be best to be able to break the enemy’s defense without fighting. War is politics where cultural methods cannot be applied and thus other means have to be employed, as pointed out by such books as:
Roots of Strategy;
The Way to Win War; or
Strategy – An Indirect Approach; or
Decisive War of History; from the books on military tactics - the study of warfare, strategy and strategists such as Sun Tzu (Sung T’ai Tsu); Clauswitz; B. Liddle Hart and Minister Let-Weh-Thon-Dra,(Burmese military art of war writer) according to their innovative teachings, the course of struggle was taken as deemed necessary.

The armed conflict with the military dictators for national democracy was taken because there was no other way. Although there was not a single tiger that has been killed and found to be herbivorous, according to one strategic model, negotiation sessions ought to be conducted whenever appropriate as a means of fighting the war.

During the entire armed resistance Mahn Ba Zan himself had recorded his participation in negotiations on tape and the original is reproduced here to preserve its essence.

The First Negotiation

111 days into the intense Insein battle, a political situation emerged. The reason was that in order to fight the Karens, negotiations (translator’s note – ‘by the AFPFL government) attemptedwith the Communists did not work out and they were turned toward us, the Karens. The twist came about thus:

To get together with the Karens, present in Rangoon, the British Ambassador Mr. Boker, the Indian Ambassador Dr. Rauf, the Pakistan Ambassador Mr. M.D.Ali, and in addition, the Anglican diocese Bishop West, and Mrs. Ba Maung Chain, daughter of Sir San C. Po, were approached to contact us. U Nu wrote to President Saw Ba U Gyi. The main content of the letter was –
“The present fighting between your people and ours is not good. The country is all burned down. Because the Karens as well as the Burmese mass have been killed, we will meet to discuss and solve these problems” - thus the overture.

President Saw Ba U Gyi accepted this and on April 6, 1949, he went to see them. At that time we had several weak points. These weak points were:

1. there was no preparation for the meeting;
2. what should be asked, and what should be done;
3. there was no arrangement; Saw Ba U Gyi was sent; along with Saw Ba U Gyi were Mahn James Tun Aung, Saw Belly, and Bishop Wes

At the meeting, because the AFPFL government was skillful in duplicity and chicanery, and also because of influence and pressure from the British, Indian, Pakistani (embassies), Bishop West and Sir San C. Po’s daughter Mrs. Clarabell Ba Maung Chain, the discussions went from peace negotiation to surrender of arms. The surrender procedure offered by the AFPFL to KNU President Saw Ba U Gyi was agreed upon and signed. According to this program, the Insein KNDO troops would surrender their major weapons, and after this surrender, Saw Ba U Gyi would be a representative in the Karen State Inquiry Commission. The surrender was to take place on April 8 at the U Thawt’s ceramic factory.

After returning, organization leaders, who were in Insein, were assembled and discussions were made. This document was tantamount to surrender. Thus, we could not accept it. The problem arose since it was unacceptable. What was to be done? This had to be nullified. If not voided, our responsibility would be too great.

Since President Saw Ba U Gyi had already signed (the document), it had to be honored. But it must be nullified before following through with it. We were mulling this over. Saw Ba U Gyi then came up with an idea. “I have signed this as President of the KNU. However, the publicized illegal organization is the KNDO. And the armed fighting is being done by the KNDO. So, carry on the discussion as KNDO’s.”

“Since Ba Zan takes the responsibility of the KNDO, Ba Zan should go and negotiate”, was the advice of President Saw Ba U Gyi. I was sent from this meeting. My being sent, I would have to accomplish the voiding of this (document). It could not be accepted. It pertained to surrendering. Then, the next day on May 5, 1949, I went over.

Arrangement was for discussion by both sides. Before the negotiation, I was to meet Sir Ba U at his house. At the meeting with Sir Ba U, I said to Sir Ba U, “Dear Uncle, our leaders do not come here to negotiate for surrender. It is to solve the conflict that is going on to the two sides, and to initiate cease-fire for both sides. The reason for this war is:
The autonomous state for the Karen nationals. The KNU has already submitted what is pertinent to the Karen State. At our negotiation, if what has been submitted by the KNU concerning the Karen State is accepted, the problem would be solved.

I told him that under no circumstances would the surrender procedure signed by our leaders be acceptable. From Sir Ba U:
“Uncle (referring to himself) doesn’t wish to say anything. If I have to state my opinion, I will sever my proposals. I am not saying what is right or wrong,” (he) told us.
Sir Ba U then called AFPFL Premier U Nu by telephone and told him of our opinion, and Foreign Minister U Aye Maung was sent over to confer with us.

When U Aye Maung arrived,
“ If you cannot accept what your great leader Saw Ba U Gyi has already accepted, we, on our side, will have to fight,” U Aye Maung put it in a rather menacing tone, which angered me. I said,
“(Look) here, U Aye Maung, our leaders came here not to negotiate for surrender, but to solve the problems so that peace can be established.
“In the negotiation, asking our leaders to surrender was an illegal act. I am going to tell you one thing, we will never accede to surrendering. You re-starting the fight against us before our surrendering is nothing strange for us. In this fight now, our blood has not even warmed up yet,” was my blunt reply to him.

After talking with U Aye Maung, a conference with the AFPFL government representatives was made again. The AFPFL representatives were:



1 U Nu
2 Bo Let Ya
3 Bo Ne Win
4 Bo Khin Maung Lay
5 Saw Kyar Doe.

At that conference, U Nu said to me, “Mahn Ba Zan, what your President Saw Ba Gyi has already signed is not going to be nice for you all to refuse.”

When I said, “To accept the document signed by our President is correct. But what the President signed means our concession, our defeat. It is the same as discarding our demands. It is quite easy to obtain peace, if so desired. It’s all finished if you can solve the demand of our Karen state”, U Nu said, “ Your people should consider one thing. You must preserve your President’s honor.” To which I replied,

“We respect our President. But your lying is not good. Our President came to you with goodwill and kindness, with the desire for peace and for the good. It is uncouth of you folks to deceitfully ask for surrender. We cannot accept this. However, there is one thing that we will do and that is our leaders will return and meet again and then make our reply.” And thus we came back to Insein after the conference.

Back in Insein, the leaders conferred and would not accept (the document signed by Saw Ba U Gyi), to which end we made our reply, which was signed by Saw Hunter Tha Hmway and the Insein military operations commander Major Aung Sein.
The conference was unsuccessful and ended in failure; thus the Insein battle continued. We had the lessons to learn.
We were young when it came to politics.
We enormously respected our great leader Saw Ba U Gyi.
We did not give him the mandate of what to discuss and to work on. When he arrived there, the President was to meet with one group here and the other there, and became confused. I was even recruited (when I met with them). Before meeting with the AFPFL, I had to confer with the Indian Ambassador Mr. Rauf and Mrs. Ba Maung Chain.
Mrs. Ba Maung Chain said, “Mahn Ba Zan, Your people should surrender your arms and continue working for the affairs of the Karen State.”
My reply to her was as we have already decided, “This is impossible. I’ll tell you one thing because we both are Karens. There is no way that they will ever grant us the kind of Karen State that we desired. To obtain the Karen State, there is no other way except through armed struggle. That’s why we will have to fight.”
It was at that juncture that the first peace negotiation was ruined.

The Second Negotiation

In 1960, during the caretaker government of Bo Ne Win, in order to establish domestic peace, a surreptitious overture was made. This secret negotiation was accepted by the KNU and delegation of representatives was selected. In that delegation were:
1. Major General Kaw Htoo (Maj. Gen. Kyaw Mya Thein)
2. S’Gaw Ler Taw
3. P’Doh Po Nyaw
4. Bo Kyin Pe
5. Bo Mya Sein

It was in February, 1960 the secret meeting with Bo Ne Win’s caretaker
government was made. The delegation for negotiations from Bo Ne Win’s caretaker
government comprised:

1. Brigadier Aung Gyi
2. Colonel Maung Maung
3. Colonel Maung Shwe, and as observers were Bo Ba Pyu, Bo San Kyi and Bo Maung Lwin.

During that mutual negotiation, the KNU replayed its old phonograph record of demanding equality, a Karen State, and the case of the Karen State to be discussed in the parliament.

For maintaining a Karen Army, the demand was made that the troops keep their weapons, and the leaders surrender a small portion of their arms as a token; the Karen State problem and the problems of keeping the Karens armed – all these were discussed on four occasions, without success, and thus the Second Negotiation ended in failure.


Third Negotiation – June 10, 1963

On June 10, 1963, a reaching out by the Revolutionary Council of Bo Ne Win for negotiation was accepted by the KNU, Mon and Karenni leaders who met earlier, selected and sent a preliminary delegation. The preliminary three-party delegation consisted of:

1. Bo Kyin Pe, - Leader
2. Mahn Lone Paung
3. Bo Tun Aye
4. Bo Myo Thway.

The three-party preliminary representatives obtained a prior agenda for the negotiations that would cover a cease-fire for the civil war and peace in the country, and returned. After their return, a three-party delegation comprising fully authorized representatives was selected. (Representatives from the three respective parties were)--

The KNU

1. Mahn Ba Zan
2. S’Gaw Ler Taw
3. Bo Kyin Pe
4. Bo Than Aung

The Karen National Progressive Party

1. Saw MawReh
2. Bo San Lin

The Mon New State Party

1. Naing Shwe Kyin
2. Naing Htin
3. Naing Tet Tun

After designation of the above representatives, the three-party delegation was organized as follows:
1. Mahn Ba Zan President
2. Naing Shwe Kyin Vice-President
3. Saw MawReh Vice-President
4. S’Gaw Ler Taw Secretary
5. Bo Kyin Pe Delegation Member
6. Bo Than Aung Delegation Member
7. Bo San Lin Delegation Member
8. Naing Htin Delegation Member
9. Naing Tet Tun Delegation Member
10. Bo Wah Sein (Lt. Gen TahMlahBaw), and Office-in-Charge and Office staff were also selected. The delegation left for negotiation on September 28, 1963, and arrived at Rangoon on September 30.

After arriving in Rangoon, negotiation sessions began with the Revolutionary Council on October 2, 1963. The Revolutionary Council was represented by:

1. Bo Ne Win
2. Bo Saw Myint
3. Bo Kyaw Soe
4. Bo Hla Han
5. Bo Thaung Dan
6. Bo Chit Khin

At that juncture, because of the belief in gaining victory through a United Front, and since it was professed that negotiating as a combined group would be more effective to achieve victory over the enemy than carrying on separate negotiations, it was agreed to conduct the negotiation as the National Democratic United Front, together with the Burma Communist Party (BCP), and the Chin Vanguard Party, who arrived earlier. The BCP delegation members were:

1. Thakin Zin
2. Thakin Tin Tun
3. Yebaw Htay
4. Bo ZeYa
5. Bo Aung Gyi
6. Bo Soe Maung
7. Bo Pu

The Chin Vanguard delegation members were:

1. S’Lai San Aung
2. S’Lai Tha Htoo

In the NDUF (National Democratic United Front) delegation that entered into negotiation with the Revolutionary Council:
1. Mahn Ba Zan President
2. Thakin Tin Tun Secretary took the main responsibilities during the discussions.

The points demanded by the Revolutionary Council at the negotiation were:
1. (We) should stay in places designated by the (Burma) Army. (They) would take responsibility for security and provisions.
2. No organizing projects should be carried out.
3. No administration and tax collection should be carried out.
4. Travelling to desired places should be done only with the approval of the responsible person.
5. Any person residing in designated areas must unquestionably obey the promulgated laws of those areas.
Such were the one-sided demands.

The above demands were unilateral demands and after 6 meetings, the Third Negotiation was terminated on November 14, 1963.

Just as there never existed a herbivorous tiger, the birthright of the people of all the country’s nationalities has not been customarily granted through benevolence. For individual rights and also for democracy, in the battlefield –or on the negotiation table -, fighting with force or meeting, will not be the solution. Only by conducting offensives and cooperation as a United Front, must the carnivorous animal be killed.